摘要
基于混合渠道存在性,本文对传统零售商公平关切与创新投入下的混合渠道供应链各方博弈及策略进行了研究。分析发现在零售商创新投入"套牢"的情况下,供应商将基于两渠道潜在需求份额、渠道需求转移系数、零售商的创新投入与公平关切等情况,采用两个不同的策略。得到了潜在需求份额对零售商创新投入力度和混合渠道存在性的影响,以及这两种情况下供应链成员Stackelberg动态博弈的零售商创新投入力度、供应链各方定价的最优决策及利润,最后分析了顾客网络渠道潜在需求份额和零售商公平关切程度对供应链成员的影响,并给出了供应链协调契约。
Considering existence conditions of mixed channel,a mixed channel supply chain members' game and strategies involving a traditional retailer's fairness concerns and innovation investment are studied.The analyses show that under the situation of the retailer's innovation investment hold-up effect,the supplier will use two different strategies based on potential demand shares of two channels,channel demand transfer coefficient,the retailer's innovation investment and fairness concerns.The effects of two channels potential demand shares on the retailer's innovation investment effort and existence conditions of mixed channel are obtained.It also gives out the optimal decisions of the retailer's innovation investment,supply chain members' pricing as well as their profits under the two situations by applying Stackelberg dynamic game.Finally,an analysis is given to show how the internet channel potential demand share and the retailer's fairness concerns affect the supply chain members,and a supply chain coordinating contract is also proposed.
作者
田巍
杨世信
梁儒谦
TIAN Wei;YANG Shi-xin;LIANG Ru-qian(School of Business Administration,Guangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanning 530003,China)
出处
《预测》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第3期84-90,共7页
Forecasting
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71461001)
关键词
混合渠道供应链
创新投入
公平关切
均衡策略
mixed channel supply chain
innovation investment
fairness concern
equilibrium strategy
