摘要
本文基于委托代理理论和上市银行的数据,研究银行高管薪酬与经营风险的内在联系。研究结论显示,高管长期薪酬及总薪酬与银行风险水平呈现负相关性,即高管长期薪酬和总薪酬水平较高时,银行经营风险相对较低。因此,应发挥银行董事会在高管薪酬制定中的作用,制定科学合理的薪酬水平和薪酬结构,运用股权激励、延期支付等长期薪酬激励方式激励银行高管,促进银行控制风险,创新经营和可持续发展。
Based on the principal-agent theory and the data of listed banks, the authors of this paper research the internal relationship between bank executive compensation and operational risks. The results of the paper show that the executive long-term compensation and total compensation are negatively correlated with the risk level of banks, which is means that the operational risks of banks are relatively low if the levels of executive long-term compensation and total compensation are high. Therefore, the board of directors of the banks should play the role in the formulation of executive compensation, determine a scientific and reasonable compensation level and compensation structure, use equity incentive, deferred payment and other long-term compensation incentives to encourage bank executives, promote the risk control, innovative management and sustainable development of banks.
作者
方蔚豪
杨文慧
FANG Wei-hao;YANG Wen-hui
出处
《金融论坛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第5期60-67,共8页
Finance Forum
基金
国家社会科学基金项目"银行高管人员薪酬激励
风险承担与监管改革研究"(15BJY024)
关键词
银行高管
高管薪酬
长期薪酬激励
经营风险
上市银行
bank executive
executive compensation
long-term compensation incentive
operational risk
listed bank
