摘要
利用中国推出放松卖空管制的准自然实验,考察了卖空机制对公司违规行为的影响。研究发现,卖空机制能抑制公司的违规行为。进一步研究发现,良好的内部控制能强化卖空机制对公司违规行为的抑制作用;相较于国有企业,卖空机制对民营企业违规行为的抑制作用更强。
By taking advantage of China’s quasi-natural experim ents of introducing loose short-selling controls, this paper examines the impact of short selling mechanisms on corporate irregularities. The findings show that short selling mechanisms can inhibit corporate violations. Further research has found that good internal control can strengthen the suppression effect of short selling mechanism on corporate irregularities. Compared with state-owned enterprises, short selling mechanism has a stronger inhibitory effect on the irregularities of private enterprise.
作者
雷啸
唐雪松
郑宇新
LEI Xiao;TANG Xue-song;ZHENG Yu-xin(Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 611130, China)
出处
《当代财经》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第4期119-130,共12页
Contemporary Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目"代理问题
任职风险与独立董事监督决策"(71372206)
中央高校基本科研业务费项目"国有企业改革与治理创新研究团队"(JBK140501)
关键词
放松卖空管制
公司违规
内部控制
产权性质
to relax short selling control
company violations
internal control
nature of property rights
