摘要
本文首先构建了一个中央政府作为委托人、地方政府作为监管者、合作社作为代理人的动态博弈的理论框架,然后基于对农民合作社的微观调查数据建立Logit和Probit模型,分析政社合谋与合作社绩效对农民合作社评级的影响。研究结果表明,具有合谋特征的合作社更容易获得合作社评级;地方政府越看重政治利益,合作社获得评级的概率越低;合作社绩效对获得评级没有显著性影响。
As an important agricultural operating entity,farmer cooperatives play an important role in the rural development and revitalization,and the rating of farmers’ cooperatives is an important means to regulate and promote the healthy development of them.This paper first constructs a theoretical framework of the dynamic game among the central government,the local government and the cooperative,in which the central government is the principal,the local government is the regulators,and the cooperative is the agent.Then it establishes the Logit and Probit models based on the micro-survey data of farmers’ cooperatives to analyze how political and social collusion and cooperative performance affect the rating of farmer cooperatives.The results show that farmers’ cooperatives with collusive characteristics can get ratings.When the local governments focus on political interests,farmers’ cooperatives find it difficult to get ratings.The performance of farmers’ cooperatives has no significant impact on the rating.This study has theoretical and practical significance for the central government to improve the cooperative rating methods and related policies,and promote the standardized development of cooperatives.
作者
杨丹
唐羽
YANG Dan;TANG Yu
出处
《农业技术经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第3期75-86,共12页
Journal of Agrotechnical Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金青年项目"农村新型合作组织的扶贫效应及相关政策研究"(编号:16CGL036)
国家社会科学基金重大项目"三权分置
农地流转与农民承包权益保护研究"(编号:15ZDA023)
国家自然科学基金国际(地区)合作与交流项目"人口变化
城乡人口流动
和中国的农业与农村发展"(编号:71361140370)
西南大学中央高校基本科研重大项目"交叉补贴视角下的中国能源价格机制设计"(编号:SWU1809022)
重庆市教育委员会人文社会科学研究重点项目(18SKSJ003)
关键词
合谋
经济绩效
社会绩效
合作社评级
Collusion
Economic performance
Social performance
Cooperative rating
