摘要
在双渠道供应链中,风险规避型供应商和有资金约束零售商如何定价是决策者需要解决的重要问题。本文基于均值-方差准则建立供应商主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,得出零售商分别选择银行贷款和延迟支付时各参与方的最优定价,并进一步比较两种融资模式下决策结果的差异。研究表明:无论零售商选择哪种融资模式,各参与方定价均随供应商风险规避程度的升高而降低,直销价格和零售价格均随融资利率的升高而升高。批发价格受利率的影响在不同融资模式中表现出不同特点,还与供应商风险规避程度有关。只有当供应商的风险规避程度超出一定范围,各参与方在银行贷款模式下的定价才会低于延迟支付中的情形,从而使零售商的期望需求处于相对更高的水平。
In the dual-channel supply chain, pricing is an important issue for the risk-averse supplier and the budget constraint retailer. Based on the mean-variance criterion, we establish a Stackelberg game model dominated by the supplier and obtain the optimal pricing decisions of each participant when the retailer chooses bank loan and delay in payment respectively, and further compare the difference of the decision-making results between the two financing modes. We find that, no matter which financing mode the retailer chooses, all the prices decrease with the increasing risk aversion degree of the supplier. The direct price and the retail price increase with the increasing interest rate. The impact of interest rate on wholesale price shows different characteristics in different financing modes, and it is also related to the risk aversion degree of the supplier. Only when the supplier’s risk aversion degree exceeds a certain range, will the participants’ prices under the bank loan mode be lower than those in the case of delay in payment, thus the retailer’s expected demand will be at a relatively higher level.
作者
史思雨
孙静春
SHI Si-yu;SUN Jing-chun(School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710049, China;The Key Lab of the Ministry of Education for Process Control & Efficiency Engineering, Xi’an 710049, China)
出处
《预测》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第2期90-96,共7页
Forecasting
关键词
双渠道供应链
供应链金融
风险规避
定价决策
dual-channel supply chain
supply chain financing
risk aversion
pricing decision
