摘要
本文以2007—2017年我国沪深两市非金融上市公司的半年度数据为研究对象,从金融投资和实业投资的视角,考察了控股股东股权质押对上市公司投资行为的影响。实证研究发现,控股股东股权质押比例与上市公司的金融投资水平呈U形关系,与上市公司的实业投资水平呈倒U形关系。这说明不同质押比例下控股股东出于不同的动机做出的改变和调整上市公司的投资决策,对金融投资和实业投资产生非线性影响。以上结论在尽可能控制内生性问题以及一系列稳健性检验后依然成立。进一步研究发现:产权性质、控制权转移风险以及金融资产与经营资产收益率差对控股股东股权质押比例与上市公司投资行为之间的关系具有重要的调节作用。本研究揭示了控股股东股权质押在公司投资策略方面的经济后果,低质押比例的控股股东更有可能支持上市公司,而高质押比例的控股股东更可能损害上市公司提供了增量证据。
Utilizing the semi-annual data of Chinese non-financial listed firms during the period of 2007-2017, this paper empirically explores whether the equity pledge by controlling shareholder will affect the investment behavior of the listed firms. This study finds that the equity pledge ratio by controlling shareholder is in a U-shape relationship with the financial investment level of the listed firms, and an inverted U-shape relationship with their real investment level. When the ratio of equity pledge by controlling shareholder is lower than a critical value, the interest between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders is more consistent, and the transfer of control right is less risky. Therefore, the controlling shareholder will participate in the core business operation of the firm and increase real investment actively. When the ratio of equity pledge by controlling shareholder is higher than a critical value, though the conflict of interest between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders aggravate the motivation of tunneling by controlling shareholder, the risk of control right transfer is more prominent. Therefore, the controlling shareholder has a stronger incentive to maintain the share price and increase financial investment. The results show that the different investment behavior and investment preference of the listed firms under the different ratio of equity pledge by controlling shareholder have non-linear influence on financial investment and real investment. The main conclusion is robust after controlling the endogeneity as much as possible. The further study shows that the U-shape and inverted U-shape relationships are regulated by corporate ownership, the risk of transfer of control rights and the difference of returns on financial assets and operating assets. This study reveals the economic consequences of controlling shareholder s equity pledge in the choice and adjustment of company investment decisions. It provides incremental evidence that controlling shareholders with lo
作者
柯艳蓉
李玉敏
吴晓晖
KE Yanrong;LI Yumin;WU Xiaohui(Xiamen University, 361005)
出处
《财贸经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第4期50-66,共17页
Finance & Trade Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目"多边代理视角下创业企业的激励机制及管理权转移研究"(71572167)
关键词
股权质押
金融投资
实业投资
Equity Pledge
Financial Investment
Real Investment
