摘要
实践中,美国《反海外腐败法》(FCPA)的大多数执法行动均是通过暂缓起诉协议(DPAs)或不起诉协议(NPAs)和解结案的。但是,在联邦监管机构考虑使用缓起诉协议(DPAs)或不起诉协议(NPA)进行协商之前,通常会权衡企业是否愿意与执法机关潜在的调查进行合作,以及是否促进并提升了企业的合规文化。正如本文展示的,合作与合规并不总是与遭受FCPA审查风险企业的最佳利益相融合。合作往往意味着要求企业律师确定实施违法行为的个人。如果这些个人在单独的行动中受到纪律处分或被起诉,由此造成的后果可能导致企业内部的个人和律师之间的互不信任,企业内部沟通的崩溃,造成不公平待遇的感觉以及不适当的风险规避举措,而所有这些从企业的角度来看均是不利的,并且可能阻碍企业维护守法文化的努力。事实上,这些并不是新问题,但由于监管机构经常以扩张方式解释FCPA,使得它们在FCPA背景下具有了特别意义。由于监管机构频繁地解释FCPA,而FCPA的复杂性与潜在行为的跨国性质,使得在允许的竞争性活动和不允许行贿之间经常出现模糊的界限。尽管许多企业最终可能认为合作带来的潜在负面影响是可以解决的,但在设计企业内部的合规计划时,企业和企业内部的律师仍然认识到这些问题至关重要,监管机构也需要意识到,他们的执法政策可能会阻碍企业自我监管的努力。
Most enforcement actions brought against firms under the U.S.Foreign Corrupt Practices Act(FCPA)are resolved via a deferred prosecution agreement(DPA)or non一prosecution agreement(NPA).But before federal regulators will consider negotiating over these types of settlement vehicles,they typically weigh a firms willingness to cooperate with the underlying investigation and whether it promoted a"culture of compliance."As this paper shows,these two factors do not always intersect in ways that serve the best interests of firms at risk for FCPA scrutiny.Cooperation often means asking company counsel to identify individual agents responsible for the alleged wrongdoing.If these agents are then disciplined or prosecuted in separate actions,the resulting dynamic can lead to distrust between agents and counsel,a breakdown in internal communications,feelings of unfair treatment,and inappropriate levels of risk aversion-all of which are undesirable from a firms perspective and can hinder efforts to maintain a law-abiding culture.These issues are not all new,but they take on particular significance in the FCPA context due to the often expansive way regulators interpret the FCPA,the complexities associated with the transnational nature of the underlying conduct,and the frequently blurry lines between permissible competitive activity and impermissible bribery.Though many firms may ultimately decide that the potentially negative effects of cooperation are worth the upside of settlement,it is essential that they and their counsel remain cognizant of these issues when designing internal compliance programs.Regulators,too,need to be aware of how their enforcement policies could hinder efforts at corporate self-policing.
出处
《河南警察学院学报》
2019年第1期29-42,共14页
Journal of Henan Police College
基金
国家社科基金重点项目"非公经济组织腐败犯罪统计调查与合作预防模式研究"(16AF010)
