摘要
宽带互联网是支撑经济发展的重要信息基础设施,但中国宽带速率和相对价格与世界发达水平相比仍有明显差距,宽带骨干网络垄断导致的网络直联水平不高是重要原因。目前我国对于骨干网垄断厂商的规制处于空白状态,骨干网络互联互通成本信息的不对称是规制者面临的难点问题。应用成本未知条件下规制垄断厂商的Baron-Myerson激励机制设计模型,制定了规制我国骨干网络互联互通市场的具体措施,并结合真实数据对规制政策进行了数值模拟,检验了其可操作性,最后提出了关于推进我国宽带发展的政策建议。
Broadband is important information infrastructure .China's broadband is distant from the world advanced level in terms of price and speeds,and the monopoly of broadband interconnection market is the one of major reasons. The unknown costs of interconnection hinders the placement of instrumental regulation policies. Applying the B-M theory of regulating with unknown costs into China’s situations,we have come the concrete regulations to relieve the market distortion,and with real data and some assumptions about the demand function,we have simulate the regulating results and confirmed its soundness,in the end,we have lined up several policy making suggestions.
作者
韩宝国
HAN Baoguo(Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area Industrial Development Research Center,School of Finance and Trade,Guangdong Industry Polytechnic,Guangzhou 510300,China)
出处
《广东轻工职业技术学院学报》
2019年第1期15-19,30,共6页
Journal of Guangdong Industry Polytechnic
基金
广东轻工职业技术学院人文社科项目"宽带网络发展的机制优化问题研究"(KJRW022)
关键词
宽带骨干网络
互联互通
垄断
规制
信息不对称
broadband
backbone
interconnection
monopoly
regulation
asymmetric information
