摘要
环境污染治理财政税收政策调节面窄、力度弱,导致整体自然环境治理面临经济约束问题。对此引入动态博弈理论,针对环境污染治理中的经济约束,提出以调节污染企业税收和提高环境补偿为目的的环境财税调节模型,打破经济约束。首先利用经济学原理,分析自然环境污染对需求函数的影响,证明环境质量改善会提高社会经济福利;设定特定的自然环境市场容量,利用企业成本函数、污染排放函数以及环境污染的经济损失函数等研究函数,研究税率政策对污染治理经济约束的影响。通过动态博弈理论,建立动态博弈过程,通过第一第二阶段博弈,确定环境保护最优税率和环境治理补偿机制,打破环境污染治理的经济约束。
Fiscal and tax policies for environmental pollution control are narrow in scope and weak in intensity, resulting in a strong binding force for the overall governance of the economy. This paper introduces the dynamic game theory and proposes an environmental finance and tax regulation model to adjust the tax revenue of polluting enterprises and improve the environmental compensation to break the economic constraint. Firstly, the effect of natural environment pollution on demand function is analyzed by using the principle of economics, and it is proved that environmental quality improvement can improve social and economic welfare. The specific capacity of natural environment market is set, and the influence of tax rate policy on the economic constraint of pollution control is studied by using the enterprise cost function, pollution emission function and economic loss function of environmental pollution. Finally, through the dynamic game theory, the dynamic game process is established. Through the first and second stage game, the optimal tax rate of environmental protection and the compensation mechanism of environmental governance are determined to break the economic constraints of environmental pollution governance.
作者
朱晓蒙
Zhu Xiaomeng(Hohai University Faculty of Public Administration, Nanjing 210000, China)
出处
《环境科学与管理》
CAS
2019年第1期46-50,共5页
Environmental Science and Management
关键词
环境污染
经济约束
动态博弈
environmental pollution
economic constraints
dynamic game
