摘要
推动军品市场公平竞争并提升效率,引导更多高水平的民品企业参与竞争,是实现国家军民融合发展战略的重要内容。目前,政府对军工企业的投资和军民工业标准之间的差异造成了民品企业难以进入军品市场。本文通过构建博弈模型,分析了政府投资如何阻止不同竞争水平的民品企业进入市场,以及军民工业标准差异对这类阻止行为的影响。结果发现:政府对军工企业正常投资会阻止一般竞争水平的民品企业进入;如果超额投资还会阻止较高竞争水平的民品企业进入,并限制已进入的高竞争水平民品企业的市场份额。进一步分析发现,减小军民工业标准的差异虽然可以提高军品市场的整体竞争效率和公平性,但在政府投资方式不改善的情况下,并不能促进民品企业进入军品市场。因此,政府应通过改变投资方式、健全投资公平机制和引入社会资本的办法,改变对军工企业独有的投资,在此基础上减小军民工业标准差异,进而促进更多高水平民品企业进入军品市场进行有效率的竞争。
To implement our national strategy of civil-military integration,it is important to promote a fair competition environment and increase its efficiency in the military products market,guiding more dominant civilian manufacturers to be willing to compete in the market.As of now,it is the investments that government makes on military manufacturers,and the discrepancy in standards between military and civil industries,that create barriers for civilian manufacturers to enter the military market.This paper uses gaming theory model to analyze how government investment could prevent different levels of civilian manufacturers to enter the market,and how the discrepancy in standards between military and civil industries may impact on this sort of interdiction.The result shows:ordinary government investments in military manufacturers would prevent the entry of commonplace civilian manufacturers;while excess investments may even create barriers for notable manufacturers,as well as limiting the market share of those who have already entered.Further study finds out that,although reducing the difference between military and civilian industrial standards could improve the overall competition efficiency and fairness of the military goods market,it will not promote the entry of civilian goods enterprises into the military goods market without improving the government's investment modes.Thus,the government should change the exclusive investment on military enterprises by changing its investment mode,establishing impartial mechanism for investments and introducing social capital.Under this premise,by reducing the discrepancy between military and civilian industrial standards,more exceptional civilian enterprises could be encouraged to enter the military market with an efficient competition.
作者
李明峰
陈波
Li Mingfeng;Chen Bo(Institute of Defense Economics and Management,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 100081,China)
出处
《南开经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第1期25-45,共21页
Nankai Economic Studies
基金
中央财经大学全球经济与可持续发展研究中心"战略安全与国家动员能力建设"专项研究(20180927)
中央财经大学"双一流"和特色发展引导专项学科建设项目资助
关键词
军民融合
政府投资
军民工业标准差异
市场竞争
Civil-Military Integration
Government Investment
Military-Civilian Industrial Standards Discrepancy
Market Competition
