摘要
会计政策是一种博弈均衡,其演化内生于经济的发展与变化,具有状态依存性和背景依存性,并不独立存在客观或者最优的会计政策。19世纪末期和20世纪初期,随着市场范围的拓展,专用性程度较高的资本性资产被大规模应用于现代企业,进而使得融资结构向长期融资转移,这奠定了"持续经营假设"的基础和市场对"盈利能力"信息的关注。现代财务会计的内在逻辑应该是植根于长期资本所有者的信息需求,即在准则制定不可能中立的情形下,偏向于长期资本所有者的信息需求,可能是更为恰当的,也是植根于历史的逻辑。
Accounting policy is a type of game equilibrium whose evolution is endogenous to the development and changes in the economy. It has state dependence and background dependence,and is not independent of objective or optimal accounting policy. In the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries,with the expansion of the market scale,capital assets with a higher degree of specificity were applied to modern enterprises on a large scale,leading to the shift of the financing structure to long-term financing,which laid the foundation of the"going concern assumption"and the attention of the market to " profitability" information. The inherent logic of modern financial accounting should be rooted in the information needs of long-term capital owners,that is,in the absence of neutrality in norm-setting,the information needs biased towards longterm capital owners may be more appropriate and also rooted in historical logic.
作者
戴泽伟
潘松剑
DAI Ze-wei;PAN Song-jian(School of Accounting,Southwestern University of Finance & Economics,Chengdu 611130,Sichuan)
出处
《厦门大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第1期67-77,共11页
Journal of Xiamen University(A Bimonthly for Studies in Arts & Social Sciences)
