摘要
文章以2009年10月到2016年12月在深圳创业板和中小板首次公开上市的上市公司为研究对象,深入分析了政治关联对风险投资策略的影响,并进一步探讨了风险投资机构特质和不同公司治理机制的调节作用。研究结论显示:政治关联企业倾向于选择联合投资策略以及分阶段投资策略;激励型公司治理机制会加强政治关联企业选择联合投资策略以及分阶段投资策略的行为;监督型公司治理机制会减弱政治关联企业选择联合投资策略以及分阶段投资策略的行为;国有风险投资机构正向调节政治关联与联合投资策略以及分阶段投资策略之间的关系;经验丰富的风险投资机构更能加剧政治关联与联合投资策略以及分阶段投资策略之间的正相关程度。本研究对拓展政治关联和风险投资领域的理论和实践具有一定的启示意义。
This paper takes the companies first listed on the Shenzhen GEM and SMEs from October 2009 to December 2016 as the research object,deeply analyzes the impact of political connections on venture capital strategies,and further explores the characteristics of venture capital institutions and the moderating effects of different corporate governance mechanisms.The results show: Politically connected enterprises tend to choose the joint investment strategy and the staged investment strategy;The incentive-based corporate governance mechanism positively moderates the relationship between political connections and the joint investment strategy and the staged investment strategy;The monitoring-based mechanism negatively moderates the re.lationship between political connections and the joint investment strategy and the staged investment strategy;The state-owned venture capital institutions positively moderates the relationship between political connections and the joint investment strate.gy and the staged investment strategy;The experienced venture capital institutions positively moderates the relationship be.tween political connections and the joint investment strategy and the staged investment strategy.This study has important im.plications for the development of theory and practice of political connections and venture capital.
作者
周霖
蔺楠
ZHOU Lin;LIN Nan(College of Business,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China)
出处
《华东经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第2期128-140,共13页
East China Economic Management
基金
上海财经大学研究生研究生科研创新基金资助项目(2016110856)
关键词
风险投资
政治关联
公司治理
机构特质
venture capital
political connections
corporate governance
institutional characteristics
