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P2P网贷中风险备用金机制对投资人行为的影响研究

The Effect of Risk Guarantee Fund Mechanism on the Behavior of Investors in Online Peer-to-Peer Loans
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摘要 基于"拍拍贷"和"人人贷"平台的交易数据,运用Probit回归模型分析了中国P2P网络借贷中风险备用金机制对投资人投资决策的影响。实证分析表明:风险备用金机制能够激励投资人投资,提升借款成功率;同时能够调节投资人对借款人风险等级的感知,为历史风险信息差的借款人提供保障,借款成功率提升效果尤为明显。因此,风险备用金机制能够有效保障借贷双方利益,增强投资人的投资信心;平台应积极响应国家监管要求,保证风险备用金账户运转规范透明。 Using the the transaction data from "PPDai"and "renrendai",the Probit regression model was conducted to analyze the effect of risk guarantee fund mechanism on investors’ investment decision in online peer-to-peer loans. The empirical study shows that: the risk guarantee fund can encourage investors to invest and improve the success rate of the borrowing,and has an effect on the investors’ perception of the borrowers’ risk level; it provides guarantee for the borrowers with information regarding negative record; the success rate of the borrowing markedly increases. These findings suggest that risk guarantee fund mechanism can effectively protect the interests of both borrowers and investors and enhance the investor’s confidence in investment. The platform should actively respond to national regulatory requirements and ensure that the operation of the fund is transparent.
作者 秦进 张虹 冯喜飞 QIN Jin;ZHANG Hong;FENG Xi-fei(School of Management,University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei 230026,Anhui,China)
出处 《华南理工大学学报(社会科学版)》 2019年第1期28-39,共12页 Journal of South China University of Technology(Social Science Edition)
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71571175)
关键词 P2P网络借贷 风险备用金 投资人行为 online peer-to-peer loans risk guarantee fund investor behavior
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