摘要
如果市场交易是最优的,为何大量交易在企业内部进行?罗纳徳·H·科斯认为,这是因为市场交易成本与企业内部交易成本不同,产权具有降低交易成本的作用。但交易成本是什么、怎么产生的、由什么来决定?奥利弗·哈特认为,这是因为契约不完全(即会发生合约中没有规定的情况),因此提高效率的关键,是把处理契约中没有详细规定情况的那部分权力,`即"剩余控制权"从而"剩余收入权",都放到同一方所有者手里。但现实已经是:控制权与所有权分离了,交易要考虑的已经不是单一的所有者了;在原来投入产出的企业模式中沉默的或隐性的在场者,已经通过利益相关者理论及其实践走到前台而成为显性存在了。应该看到,现代企业和产权的现实变化,已经突破了传统的控制权、产权概念,提出了具有挑战性和重要现实意义的新课题。最近几十年经济伦理理论和实践的发展以及中国的创新实践,已经提供了对哈特因而科斯问题以及中国国企改革的值得重视的新视角。
If market trading is optimal, why do a large number of transactions take place within the enterprise? According to Ronald H. Coase, this is because the transaction cost in the market is different from the transaction cost within the enterprise, and the property right has the effect of reducing the transaction cost. But what are transaction costs, how do they arise, and by what?Oliver Hart(2016 Nobel Prize winner in economics) argues that this is because the contract is incomplete, and therefore the key to improve efficiency is to place in the hands of the same party, the part of power that is not specified in the contract, what he calls "residual control" and "residual income rights". In my opinion, the reality is already: the control and ownership are separated, the transaction is not a single owner; the silent or implicit presence in the original input-output enterprise model has come to the front stage through stakeholder theory and practice and become a dominant existence. It should be noted that the realistic changes of modern enterprises and property rights have broken through the traditional concepts of control rights and property rights, and put forward new topics with challenging and important practical significance. The development of business ethics theory and practice in recent decades, as well as the innovation practice in China, has provided a new perspective for the Hart-Coase’s problem and the reform of state-owned enterprises in China.
作者
陆晓禾
LU Xiaohe(Center for Business Ethics,Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences,Shanghai 200235,China)
出处
《云梦学刊》
2019年第1期59-65,共7页
Journal of Yunmeng
