摘要
以2012—2016年发布业绩预测公告的创业板上市公司为样本,采用回归分析法,分析了创业板上市公司的盈利预测质量是否会受到CEO权力强度的影响,以及内部控制质量和产权性质对两者关系的调节作用。研究发现,CEO权力强度与盈利预测质量呈显著负相关关系,高质量内部控制整体上能够显著抑制CEO权力强度对于盈余预测质量的负面影响。进一步研究发现,即使在CEO权力较大的样本区间内,内部控制在保证会计信息质量方面依然有效。在多重委托代理关系下,国有产权性质强化了CEO权力强度对于盈利预测质量的负面影响。
This paper makes a regression analysis on whether the earning forecast quality of the GEM listed companies is influenced by CEO power,and the property rights and internal control regulates their relationship,which takes the GEM listed companies released performance forecast announcement from 2012 to 2016 as a sample.The research Indicates that there is a significant negative correlation between CEO power and the earning forecast quality.High-quality internal control will significantly restrain this negative correlation.Furthermore,even though in the sample of bigger CEO power,internal control is still effective in guaranteeing the quality of accounting information.Meanwhile,under the relationship of multi-agency,the nature of State-owned property rights will significantly enhance the negative correlation between CEO power and the earning forecast quality.
作者
陈国辉
伊闽南
CHEN Guohui;YI Minnan(School of Accounting,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116025,China)
出处
《审计与经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第5期46-54,共9页
Journal of Audit & Economics
关键词
CEO权力强度
内部控制质量
产权性质
盈利预测质量
盈余管理
会计信息质量
公司治理
CEO power
the quality of internal control
property rightss
earnings forecast quality
earnings management
quality of accounting information
corporate governance
