摘要
2015年推出的存款保险制度(DIS)是我国提高系统性风险防范能力的重要举措。长期以来,我国实行隐性全额存款担保,由政府为问题银行完全兜底,这与美国、加拿大等早期建立DIS的国家差异较大,难以直接借鉴其经验。因此,本文基于后期推行显性DIS的57个国家的跨国面板数据,考察从隐性DIS转换到显性DIS对金融危机发生概率的影响,发现显性DIS显著增加了银行退出的概率,同时对金融体系其他部分具有"溢出效应",能够显著降低非银行类金融危机的概率。这是由于显性DIS仅提供有限保险,减少了道德风险,有助于问题银行退出市场,同时减轻了政府的财政负担,降低了系统性金融风险。进一步,本文考虑不同设计要素对银行危机与其他金融危机的不同影响,发现对银行部门最优的DIS制度安排,对整个金融体系并非最优。结合十九大"守住不发生系统性金融风险的底线"要求,本文就我国的《存款保险条例》提出了改进建议。
Summary:China adopted the explicit deposit insurance scheme(DIS)on May 1,2015.The adoption of the explicit DIS is an important step allowing the Chinese government to forestall systemic financial risks.It is worth noting that the governments of countries that adopted the explicit DIS earlier,such as the U.S.,provided little implicit protection for their banking sector.In contrast,the Chinese government offered implicit blanket deposit insurance for banks prior to its implementation of the explicit DIS because of the systematic importance of the banking sector to China's real economy.Therefore,it is difficult for China to learn from the experiences of developed countries such as the U.S..For countries like China,of which the governments offered an implicit blanket guarantee to both gigantic state-owned commercial banks and small rural and urban credit unions,the adoption of the explicit DIS has not only a direct impact on the banking sector,but also a spillover effect on other parts of the financial system.After the adoption of the explicit DIS,the government no longer has the responsibility for providing full financial support to banks,and bank exits become possible.Therefore,the direct effect of the explicit DIS on the stability of China's banking sector is likely to be negative.However,the total fiscal position will likely not deteriorate as much as it did during earlier episodes.Therefore,the“spillover effect”of the explicit DIS on the entire financial system could be positive.This paper focuses on the countries that adopted the explicit DIS after the 1970s,which are similar to China.Based on data from 57 countries between 1970 and 2009,we investigate the impact of the explicit DIS on different types of financial crises.The results show that the explicit DIS increases the likelihood of bank exits but decreases the probability of other financial crises.The results are robust to the use of 2SLS regressions,an alternative definition of different types of financial crises,additional controls for global financi
作者
纪洋
边文龙
黄益平
JI Yang;BIAN Wenlong;HUANG Yiping(School of Economics,Xiamen University;Sungkyunkwan University;National School of Development,Peking University)
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第8期20-35,共16页
Economic Research Journal
基金
本文受到“计量经济学”教育部重点实验室(厦门大学)、福建省统计科学重点实验室和“高等学校学科创新引智计划资助”(B13028)、中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金和国家自然科学基金项目“利率市场化背景下的存款保险制度与金融风险研究:跨国实证分析与中国实践”的资助与支持。
关键词
隐性存款保险
显性存款保险
金融危机
Implicit Deposit Insurance
Explicit Deposit Insurance
Bank Exit
Financial crisis
