摘要
清辨在《般若灯论》(■)、《中观心论》(■)和《大乘掌珍论》中对瑜伽行派"所缘真如"的观点进行了批判。其中,若干藏译《般若灯论》的相关表述和汉译《大乘掌珍论》对应度很高。针对有相唯识派关于无分别智亲证真如的论述,清辨认为它在教义经典和逻辑上都不合理,他建立了两个因明论式对此进行了反驳。他指出,瑜伽行派将真如当作认识对象(所缘)一方面违反了经典中对于无分别智没有认识活动、不具有认识对象的描述;另一方面,将真如视作认识对象会抹杀圣者之智慧与凡夫之认识在本质上的差别,也即解脱与流转无异。
Bhāviveka criticizes the Yogācāra doctrine on“the thusness as a cognitive object(ālambana)”in his Prajāpradīpa,Madhyamakahrdaya and Da Cheng Zhang Zhen Lun.Some relevant Tibetan texts in Prajāpradīpa are corresponding to some Chinese texts in Da Cheng Zhang Zhen Lun.According to the theory of Sākāravijānavādin in Yogācāra school,the wisdom(Prajā)can cognize the thusness as its object without any conceptualization.Bhāviveka thinks this doctrine is not correct,because it is contrary to both the Sūtras and logic.He establishes two syllogisms to refute it.He says,on one hand,this doctrine betrays what Buddha said in the Sūtras that the wisdom operates without any activities and objects;on the other hand,if the thusness was considered as a cognitive object,then the wisdom would not be distinguished from the consciousness,that is to say,the Enlightened one and ordinary people would be the same.
作者
茅宇凡
Mao Yu-fan(Department of Philosophy,Shanghai University,Shanghai 200444,China)
出处
《西藏研究》
北大核心
2017年第2期40-47,共8页
Tibetan Studies
关键词
清辨
瑜伽行派
无分别智
所缘
真如
Bhāviveka
Yogācāra
Wisdom
Cognitive Object
Thusness
