摘要
改进了委托-代理理论中企业业绩与经理努力关系模型。用此模型分析了电力企业的固定工资制、经理责任制和年薪制3种报酬形式及国际流行的股票期权报酬激励。发现股票期权报酬在缓解委托代理冲突方面,优于前3种报酬形式。建议电力国企对经理实行股票期权激励。
The paper improves the model between firm performance and managerial effort. It analyzes the compensation methods of fixed payment, the management responsibility system, the annual salary system and the stock option compensation. It is found that the stock option compensation results in the least principal-agent conflict. It is proposed that the power utilities use stock options as managerial compensation.
出处
《华北电力大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
北大核心
2002年第4期69-72,共4页
Journal of North China Electric Power University：Natural Science Edition
基金
教育部高等学校博士点专项科研基金资助项目
国家电力公司重点科技项目(SPKJ002-15)
