摘要
党的十六大后,国家通过成立国有资产管理委员作为解决国有企业改革的一个主要途径。尽管国资委的成立解决了国有企业"五龙治水"的局面,但国资委如何有效的管理国有企业,是一个亟待解决的理论与实践问题。本文将从理论上对国有企业的委托代理关系进行博弈分析,探索解决委托代理问题的新途径,为进一步推进国有企业的改革提出一些政策性建议。
After the 16th Congress of CCP, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) was set up as one of the main ways of solving the reform of the state-owned enterprises. The building of SASAC has solved the phases that the state-owned assets were administrated by five different Departments, but it is still an urgent academic and practical problem for SASAC to efficiently manage the state-owned assets. On this paper, I have analyzed the game relation of the principal-agent relation of the state-owned Enterprises and found the new ways to solve the principal-agent problem. Finally, some proposals have been tabled on the further state-owned enterprises reform.
出处
《华中师范大学研究生学报》
2005年第3期102-105,共4页
Central China Normal University Journal of Postgraduates
关键词
国有企业
委托代理
产权改革
state-owned enterprises
principal-agent
property rights reform
