摘要
本文通过对唐园小区的分析,剖析了一个社区的产生和变迁,认为社区的产生是一个地域的概念,而社区的形成却是一个制度的概念,即以业主组织制度为主的一系列制度的形成为标志。由于种种原因,业主组织制度难以形成,导致一系列非合作结果的发生。本文着重论述了制度博弈过程中行动集团的形成、分化及变迁,以及惩罚承诺、沉淀成本、替代品等对无限重复博弈的影响。
This paper analyzes the birth and evolution of a community through the analysis of Tangyuan Community,and makes the conclusion that the birth of a community is a regional concept,whereas the formation of community is an institu- tional concept,namely,taking the formation of a series of institutions in which the owner's organizational institution is the common core as the sign.The owners' organizational institution is difficult to take shape for various reasons,which has caused the emergence of a series of non-cooperative consequences.The paper has emphatically expounded the formation,division and changes of action groups in the course of institutional game,and the influence of commitment of punishment, sunk cost,substitute,etc.towards the infinitely-repeated game.
出处
《制度经济学研究》
2005年第4期118-137,共20页
Research on Institutional Economics
关键词
社区
制度
业主委员会
囚徒困境
Community
Institution
Owners'Committee
Prisoner's Dilemma
