摘要
本文以电信业为例,通过双头垄断网络运营商之间接入价格决策的博弈模型分析,比较研究对等与非对等接入定价的效率及其规制改革问题,在讨论接入规制目标的基础上,提出可选接入规制方案。本文一个重要观点是,接入成本将影响零售服务价格;对于电信运营商,拥有多少用户固然重要,但更重要的是用户消费多少电话量。
The case of telecom with two duopoly enterprises deciding the accessing fees to connect each other is examined in this paper. Via game theoretical model, the economic efficiency of access pricing with/without price discrimination is compared and regulation policy is proposed . A key point here is that the payment to connection by a telecom enterprise will be added to the cost of service to final customers, hence retail price would be increased, and to a telecom enterprise, the total volume of calls would be more important than the volume of users enrolled.
出处
《上海管理科学》
2002年第2期14-17,共4页
Shanghai Management Science
基金
复旦大学三年行动计划重点交叉学科"电子商务" 复旦大学管理学院青年科学研究基金
