摘要
本文以我国2004~2015年沪深两市非金融类上市公司季度数据为样本,系统考察了控股股东股权质押对管理层盈余预测策略选择的影响。研究发现上市公司管理层在控股股东股权质押前,有强烈的动机发布“好消息”或“正向偏差”的机会主义盈余预测。进一步研究表明,控股股东股权质押前的市场表现越差,管理层发布机会主义盈余预测的动机越强;管理层配合控股股东股权质押的机会主义盈余预测动机在质押前最强、质押期内次之、解押后最弱;严格的外部监督有助于抑制管理层采用乐观的预测策略。本文的研究结论为市场各方洞悉我国上市公司控股股东与管理层之间的合谋行为提供了新的经验证据,也为投资者决策以及监管者制定相关政策提供了新的参考。
Using a sample of Chinese listed companies from 2004 to 2015 on the A-Share market of China,this paper empirically investigates the effect of controlling shareholders’ stock pledge on management earnings forecasts strategies. The results indicate that managers have strong incentives to report good news and positively biased forecasts prior to controlling shareholders’ stock pledge,especially in firms with poor pre-forecast market performance,while rigid regulatory policies and external supervision mechanisms can constrain managers’ ex ante opportunistic forecast strategies to some extent. The conclusions can not only provide a new and direct evidence for the collusion behavior of controlling shareholders and managers,but also can help people understand the interest conflict behind controlling shareholders’ stock pledge. Meanwhile,the results can provide references for investors to make investment decisions and for the market regulators to establish regulatory policies.
出处
《当代会计评论》
CSSCI
2017年第2期132-158,共27页
Contemporary Accounting Review
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目“控股股东股权质押动机、经济后果与治理机制研究”(71672157)的阶段性成果
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“大数据环境下财务报告分析框架的重构与应用”(15JJD630011)的资助
关键词
控股股东
股权质押
管理层盈余预测
好消息
正向偏差
controlling shareholder
stock pledge
management earnings forecast
good news
positive forecast bias
