摘要
本文利用内生侵占行为和内生专业化分工的一般均衡模型,研究侵占行为对均衡状态的分工网络规模、社会总产出以及人均实际收入的影响。如果一个个体成员能够侵占其邻国或其交易对方,那么,交易运输效率的上升或侵占行为效率的降低都将提高劳动分工水平,在此劳动分工水平下,每一个个体成员配置在侵占行为上的资源或者高于或者低于自给自足分工结构。这表明人均实际收入、均衡劳动分工水平和侵占行为相互作用下的一般均衡分析的复杂结果,常常与传统的常识判断"富则思安,穷则思盗"不相一致。交易运输效率的提高或(和)侵占行为效率的降低将提高均衡劳动分工水平,并藉以扩大市场容量,提高人均实际收入和社会总产出。
This paper develops a general equilibrium mod- el with endogenous specialization and endogenous theft behavior to investigate effects of theft on the equilibrium network size of division of labor,on aggregate productiv- ity,and on per capita real income.If an individual can steal from her neighbors or her trade partners,then an increase in transportation efficiency or a decrease in steal- ing efficiency will increase the level of division of labor where each individual's resources allocated to theft may be either lower or higher than in autarky.This shows the conventional wisdom that'Wealth reduces the desire for stealing and poverty stimulates theft.'is not always consistent with a sophisticated general equilibrium analy- sis of interdependence between per capita real income and equilibrium levels of division of labor and stealing activi- ty.An increase in transportation efficiency and/or a decrease in stealing efficiency will raise the equilibrium level of division of labor,thereby enlarging the extent of the market,and increase aggregate productivity and per capita real income.
出处
《南大商学评论》
2005年第1期74-94,共21页
Nanjing Business Review
关键词
劳动分工
产权
专业化
霍布斯丛林法则
division of labor
property rights
Specialization
Hobbes' Jungle
