摘要
内部人控制是股权分散情况下现代大公司普遍存在的问题,但在我国经济转轨时期,国有企业出现了被扭曲的内部人控制问题;通过对我国国有企业经理人与行政组织的重复博弈、与企业组织的一次性博弈的分析,找出了我国国有企业内部人控制产生的制度性根源;进而提出减少内部人控制问题、完善国有企业治理结构的政策建议。
Insider control in big enterprises is common phenomenon because of the information asymmetry.Based on the economic transformation in China,special problems of the insider control in the state-owned enterprises (SOE) have emerged.Through the analysis on the dual games between the managers and the administrative organizations,and one-time game between managers in the SOE and the enterprises organization,we have found the root of the phenomena;put forward the problem of cutting down insider control,and policy suggestions to perfecting the governance structure of SOE.
出处
《长春大学学报》
2007年第9期5-8,共4页
Journal of Changchun University
关键词
国有企业
内部人控制
双重博弈
stated-owned-enterprises
insider control
dual games
