摘要
随着法治中国的进步,中国各领域的司法制度逐步发展和完善,但在行政诉讼撤诉中存在相当比例的官民不良博弈问题。此类案件撤诉比例相当高,并且背后的撤诉原因呈现出多样化以及主体身份的复杂性。这种不良博弈会导致公共利益在司法协商博弈过程中的私人分割,同时也不利于社会舆论的评价与监督,甚至导致法院审理提供的平台无法实现真正意义上的对等,从而影响到司法的公信力。因此在对待这类案件时,需要处理好其中存在的公民的非理性诉求,同时也要防止公权力机关对司法诉讼的干预,做到"把权力关进制度的笼子",从根本上完善司法机关撤诉审查制度,切实维护司法机关的独立审判制度,从而真正全方位解决行政诉讼撤诉中存在的不良博弈问题。
With the progress of the rule of law in China, the judicial system in all areas of China has gradually developed and improved, but there is a significant proportion of the government＇s bad game in the administrative litigation. The proportion of such cases is quite high, and the reasons behind the withdrawal are diverse and complex. This kind of bad game will result in the public interest in the game in the process of private juridical consultative segmentation, but also not conducive to the evaluation and supervision of public opinion at the same time, and even lead a court not to realize the true sense of equality, which affect the judicial credibility. So in dealing with such cases, we need to deal with the citizens irrational demands, but also to prevent the public power authority from intervening the judicial litigation, do ＂ Put power in the cage of the system＂, fundamentally improve the system of judiciary case review, to safeguard the independence of judicial organs trial system, which are really comprehensively solving problems existing in the administrative litigation case of bad game.
作者
吴玉婷
WU Yuting(East China University of Political Science and Law,Shanghai,20004)
出处
《武夷学院学报》
2018年第8期21-28,共8页
Journal of Wuyi University
关键词
行政撤诉
不良博弈
非理性
撤诉审查
administrative withdrawal
bad game
irrational
case review
