摘要
伊斯特林的认知生态批评采用了大量的认知科学、进化论的新成果；生态问题重点指向非人类的自然，但这个现象背后仍然以心理活动为支撑，可以用认知科学进行分析；伊斯特林不像天真的现实主义那样相信大脑能够毫无偏见地再现外在世界，也不像强烈的建构主义或者激进的怀疑主义把心灵中的再现看作独立于现实的现象，她采用的是辩证的知识论；她还将世界置于进化的链条中进行考察，认为万物彼此有用、相互联系，破除了自然一文化的二分法：认知生态批评认为世界处于动态的平衡之中，不必一味地追求和谐，一味地指责人这个主体。
New findings in cognitive science and evolution have been used in Easrerlin＇s theory of cognitive ecocriticism; eco problems, focusing on nonhuman nature, can also be studied from the perspective of cognitive science and evolution, because they are essentially connected with the mind; unlike the naive realists, who think the mental representations correspond exactly to external phenomena, or the strong constructionists and radical skeptics, who think that the mind＇s representations have no reference to realities, Easterlin＇s bioepistemology adopts a dialogic method, referring both to the subject and realities; the world is examined against the chain of evolution; everything is useful and related to each other, dissolving the nature-culture dichotomy; the world is a conflicting and yet coherent whole; k is not always necessary to criticize the human beings as the upsetting element to the harmony of nature.
出处
《文学理论前沿》
CSSCI
2017年第1期17-29,共13页
Frontiers of Literary Theory
