摘要
随着存款保险制度的推出以及金融机构退出机制的完善,国家声誉将逐渐退出银行无形资本。在激励相容的金融监管趋势下,特许权价值等市场约束力量会显著影响到商业银行的风险承担。在此逻辑基础上,以我国16家上市商业银行为研究对象,一方面探讨特许权价值影响下不同产权结构的商业银行的最优救助机制,另一方面通过最优救助临界指标,利用银行重组模型,推导合理的存款保险风险差别费率。
With the introduction of the deposit insurance system and the perfection of the withdrawal mechanism of financial institutions, the national reputation will gradually withdraw from the intangible capital of bank. Under the trend of incentive and compatible financial supervision, such market binding forces as franchise value will significantly affect the risk-taking of eomnlereial banks. On the basis of this logic, this paper takes 16 listed eomnlereial banks in China as the research object. On the one hand, it discusses the optimal rescue mechanism of commercial banks with different property- rights structure under the influenee of franchise value. On the other hand, by using the optimal rescue critical index and the bank restructuring model, it deduces the reasonable risk differential rate of deposit insurance.
作者
孙杨
王伟
王烨
SUN Yang;WANG Wei;WANG Ye(School of Finance,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 211815,China;Nanjing Branch,Ningbo Bank,Nanjing 210019,China)
出处
《南京审计大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第6期81-88,共8页
Journal of Nanjing Audit University
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71373114)
关键词
存款保险定价
最优关闭策略
特许权价值
金融改革
存款保险风险差别费率
存款保险制度
deposit insurance pricing
optimal closing strategy
franchise value
financial reform
risk differential rate of deposit insurance
deposit insurance system
