摘要
本文运用演化博弈,从共性技术外部性、后续商业开发及政府支持方面分析了供应商面向多制造商技术研发决策演化及机理。研究表明:共性技术外部性使得博弈演化稳定于由研发不同技术供应商共存的均衡,研发损益参数对均衡有显著影响;共性技术后续商业开发难度对供应商研发决策的影响依其外部性强弱而定,随着后续开发难度增加,外部性较强促使供应商研发专用技术,反之则研发共性技术;政府支持激励着供应商研发共性技术,而技术支持对供应商研发行为具有更强的激励作用。根据上述结论,得出供应商技术研发决策四象限分析矩阵,并根据共性技术所处象限,从补贴、技术和其他支持视角提出权变运用的政策建议,为政府引导供应商技术研发决策提供参考。
This paper, which uses evolutionary game, analyzes the evolution and mechanism of supplier oriented multi-manufacturer technology R＆D decision-making under the generic technology externality, subsequent business development and government support. The results show that the generic technology externality makes the game evolution stable in the equilibrium of coexistence of different technology suppliers and the parameters of R＆D profit and loss have a significant impact on the equilibrium; the effect of subsequent developing difficulty of the generic technology on supplier＇s R＆D decisions depends on the degree of externality of generic technology, and with the increase of subsequent developing difficulty, the externality is strong to promote the supplier＇s R＆D specific technology, otherwise suppliers choose generic technology R＆D; government supports motivate suppliers to develop generic technology, and technology support has greater incentives for suppliers. Finally, this paper draws a four-quadrant analysis matrix of supplier＇s R＆D decision-making, and relevant policy suggestions are put forward from subsidies, technology and other supports, which provide the reference for government to guide supplier＇s technology R＆D decision-making.
出处
《企业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第8期78-83,共6页
Enterprise Economy
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目"知识服务机构联结多样化与制造企业服务创新绩效关系研究:双元搜索的视角"(项目编号:71603033)
重庆市教委科学技术研究项目"制造业企业共性技术合作创新与扩散机制研究"(项目编号:KJ1600632)
重庆市高校网络舆情与思想动态研究咨政中心开放基金项目"博弈视阈下校园网贷舆情演化及应对策略研究"(项目编号:KFJJ2017020)
重庆市高校创新团队建设计划项目"家族企业成长与区域经济发展"(项目编号:CXTDX201601027)
关键词
共性技术
专用技术
研发决策
演化博弈
供应商
generic technology
specific technology
R＆D decision-making
evolutionary game
suppliers
