摘要
采用固定效应模型,依据2000~2015年中国沪深两市A股公司的样本,首先检验高管权力对资本结构调整速度的影响,然后考察机构投资者持股及其异质性对高管权力与资本结构调整速度之间关系的影响.研究发现,高管权力越大,资本结构调整速度越慢;区分不同负债水平后,高管权力与资本结构调整速度之间的负向关系仅存在于实际资本结构低于目标水平时.从整体上看,机构投资者持股对高管权力与资本结构调整速度之间的关系影响不显著;而相对于交易型机构投资者,稳定型机构投资者持股有利于减弱高管权力与资本结构调整速度之间的负向关系,对高管权力具有一定约束作用,优化了资本结构决策.
The fixed effect model based on the data of China＇s A-share listed companies in 2000～ 2015 was used to analyze the effect of executive power on the speed of capital structure adjustment. Then the effect of institutional investors＇ holding and its heterogeneity on the relationship between executive power and the speed of capital structure adjustment was further investigated. The results showed that the more powerful an executive has,the lower the speed of capital structure adjustment would be. After distinguishing different debt levels,the negative relationship between executive power and the speed of capital structure adjustment exists only when the actual captical structure is lower than the target level. On the whole,institutional investors＇ holding has no significant influence on the relationship between executive power and the speed of capital structure adjustment. However,stable institutional investors＇ holding can weaken the negative correlation between executive power and the speed of capital structure adjustment with respect to short-termism institutional investors. It contributes to the restraint of executive power and optimizes the decision making of capital structure.
作者
侯丽
钟田丽
张天宇
HOU Li;ZHONG Tian-li;ZHANG Tian-yu(School of Business Administration,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110169,China.)
出处
《东北大学学报（自然科学版）》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2018年第7期1053-1058,共6页
Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71150002)
关键词
高管权力
资本结构
调整速度
机构投资者持股
异质性
executive power
capital structure
speed of adjustment
institutional investors ＇holding
heterogeneity
