期刊文献+

关于优化企业后台支撑部门划小承包的思考

The Optimization of the Contract Management for Supportting Team
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摘要 当前,一些企业在后台支撑单元开展划小承包,通过进一步深化划小承包工作,建立维护工作价值化的核算模式,在保障后台网络和服务质量的前提下,加强技术支撑成本的精确化配置,实现维护效率、效益和价值的新提升,更好的支撑市场发展。但和营销单元相比,后台支撑部门的"市场化"机制相对薄弱甚至和企业经营脱节。本文以A公司为例,在总结经营单元管理经验的基础上探索在后台支撑部门全面推行"经济责任制"的管理体系,从而彻底实现企业内部运作的市场化,激发企业活力。 At present, some enterprises carry out small contract in the backstage support unit, and by further deepening the work of small contracting, establish the accounting model of the maintenance work value, and strengthen the cost of technical support under the premise of guaranteeing the background network and the quality of service. The accurate allocation will bring about a new promotion of maintenance efficiency, efficiency and value, and better support the development of the market. But compared with marketing units, the "marketization" mechanism of the backstage support department is relatively weak and even disjointed with the business operation. This paper, taking A company as an example, explores the management system of "economic responsibility system" in the backstage support department on the basis of summarizing the management experience of the management unit, so as to completely realize the marketization of the internal operation of the enterprise and stimulate the vitality of the enterprise.
作者 陈佳庆 CHEN Jia-qing(Septwolves Group,Xiamen 361000,China)
出处 《价值工程》 2018年第24期64-66,共3页 Value Engineering
关键词 后台支撑 划小承包 优化 backstage support small contract optimization
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