摘要
基于我国2007—2016年上市公司数据,实证检验了卖空机制的引入对于公司过度投资的影响及作用机理,研究发现,卖空机制可以显著抑制公司过度投资。分批次检验显示,卖空的抑制作用逐批递减,且卖空规模对过度投资无显著影响,说明卖空主要发挥事前威慑而非事后惩罚作用。此外,卖空对过度投资的抑制作用在市场化进程较高的地区更加显著。作用机制检验发现,卖空主要通过降低管理层过度自信影响公司投资,且当信息不对称程度较低时效果更加显著。
Based on the data of Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2016, this paper investigates the impact and action mechanism of the introduction of short selling mechanism on over-investment of the company. It finds that short selling mechanism can significantly inhibit the over-investment behavior in companies. However, the results of batch test show that the suppression effect of short selling decrease lot by lot, and the short selling scale doesn＇t exert significant influence on over-investment, which indicates that short selling mainly plays an active pre-deterrence role rather than a post-punishment role. The paper also finds that the inhibitory effect of short selling on over-investment is even more pronounced in areas with higher marketization. In addition, the action mechanism test finds that short selling affects companies＇ investment mainly through lowering management over-confidence, which effect is more significant in the state of lower information asymmetry.
作者
孙文晶
王明伟
叶建华
SUN Wen-jing;WANG Ming-wei;YE Jian-hua(School of Accounting,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,Chengdu 611130;School of Finance,Henan University of Economics and Law,Zhengzhou 450000;School of Accounting,Henan University of Economics and Law,Zhengzhou 450000,China)
出处
《山西财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第8期27-41,共15页
Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71602049)
河南省高等学校重点科研项目(17A630003)
关键词
卖空
过度投资
事前威慑
过度自信
short selling
over-investment
pre-deterrence
over-confidence
