摘要
在指数函数需求下，建立两级供应链Stackelberg主从博弈模型，引入供应链成员的利他偏好，分别探讨了仅制造商具有利他偏好、仅零售商具有利他偏好及双方都具有利他偏好三种情形下利他偏好对供应链成员定价决策和利润的影响以及批发价格契约的协调性．相关结论如下：供应链成员的利他偏好能够促进对方利润的增加，但不一定总能够提升供应链整体绩效．当仅有零售商具有利他偏好时，供应链整体绩效水平不变；在仅有制造商具有利他偏好和双方都具有利他偏好下，供应链整体绩效水平介于无利他偏好情形下分散决策与集中决策之间，且在一定条件下能够达到集中决策时的最优绩效水平．这些结论不仅能够为供应链成员选择合作伙伴提供理论支持，也进一步拓展了批发价格契约协调供应链的理论与应用．
In the case of exponential demand depends on the sales price, this paper develops a two-echelon supply chain model under stackelberg game framework with a manufacturer and a retailer. The altruistic preference of supply chain member is considered. The influence of the supply chain member＇s altruistic preference on the pricing strategies, profits and the coordination role of wholesale price contract are analyzed in three scenarios： only the manufacturer concerns altruistic preference, only the retailer concerns altruistic preference, and both partners focus on altruistic preference. The conclusions are as follows： The altruistic preference of the supply chain members can increase the profit of the other party, but not always be able to improve the overall performance of the supply chain. When only the retailer has a altruistic preference, the overall performance level of the supply chain remains unchanged. In the case of only the manufacturer concerns altruistic preference and both partners focus on altruistic preference, the overall performance level of the supply chain is between the decentralized decision-making and the centralized decision-making in the absence of altruistic preference model, and the optimal performance level can be achieved under certain conditions. These conclusions can not only provide theoretical support for supply chain members to choose partners, but also further expand the theory and application of the wholesale price contract to coordinate supply chain.
作者
林强
邓正华
LIN Qiang, DENG Zheng-hua(Research Center for Infant Products and Services Supply Chain, Chongqing University of Education, Chongqing 400067, Chin)
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
北大核心
2018年第14期129-138,共10页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基金
重庆市教委科学技术研究项目(KJ1601409)
