摘要
由于契约的不完全性、专用性资产的存在,导致民企参军的谈判过程中,一方可能利用另一方因专用性资产投资的锁定效应,而采取机会主义行为将另一方套牢,攫取可占用专用性准租金。这种套牢风险不是单向的,而是双向的,双向套牢风险的存在不仅会降低军品科研生产项目建设质量,而且还会严重挫伤民营企业承担军品科研生产任务的积极性。为有效防范双向套牢风险,本文将从博弈论的角度,建立民营企业与军队采办部门的期望收益与专用性资产投资的函数关系和博弈矩阵,分阶段讨论民营企业与军队采办部门所面临的套牢风险大小及各自的最佳行为选择。以降低民企参军面临的套牢风险,引导更多优势民营企业进入军品科研生产与维修领域,推动军民融合的深度发展。
Due to the incompleteness of the contract and the existence of special assets, in the negotiation process of private enterprises participating in the military manufacturing, one party may use the locking effect of the other party due to the investment of specific assets, adopt opportunistic behavior to hold the other party firmly and occupy special-purpose quasi-rent. This risk of arbitrage is not one-way, but two-way. The existence of two-way lock risk will not only reduce the quality of military scientific research and production projects, but also seriously dampen the enthusiasm of private enterprises to undertake military research and production tasks. In order to effectively prevent the risk of two-way interlocking, this paper will establish the functional relationship and the game matrix between expected returns of private enterprises and military procurement departments from the perspective of game theory, and discusses in stages the private companies and the armed forces＇ acquisition departments. Risks and their best behavior choices to reduce the risk of private enterprises joining the military and to lead more private enterprises to enter the field of military scientific research production and maintenance, and promote the deep development of military-military integration.
作者
郭琳达
文韬
GUO Linda;WEN Tao(Joint Service College,National Defense University,Beijing 100858,China;31008 Unit,Be~iing 100091,China)
出处
《国防科技》
2018年第3期95-98,104,共5页
National Defense Technology
关键词
套牢风险
民企参军
博弈均衡
军民融合
lock risk
private enterprises join the military manufacturing
game equilibrium
military-civilian integration
