摘要
近年来国际投资争端解决机制表现出诸多新的发展态势,诱发了平行程序。各国间大量双边投资协定的并存导致争端解决机制的扇形化,投资者可以通过条约挑选触发平行程序。各国在缔结投资协定时趋向于在同一协定中同时规定多种争端解决方法,导致争端解决机制的橄榄形化,投资者因启动两种或以上的争端解决机制而形成平行程序。同时,越来越多的投资协定开始放弃＂用尽当地救济＂原则,从而导致东道国国内救济程序与国际救济程序之间链式衔接的断裂,程序的分离促成了平行程序的发生。
The development tendency of settlement mechanisms of international investment disputes in recent years may result in parallel proceedings. As one country can make many BITs with different countries,that provides investors＇ opportunities to initiate parallel proceedings when investors choose clauses intentionally. Also because of various methods for disputes settlement stipulated in one BIT,investors may initiate more than one proceeding. Besides,it is possible to lead to parallel proceedings based on the lack of exhaustion of local remedies clauses,and the indefinite definitions of investors and investments in international investment treaties may result in parallel proceedings.
出处
《政法论坛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第4期69-78,共10页
Tribune of Political Science and Law
基金
重庆市社会科学规划项目(2017BS42)
重庆大学中央高校基金项目(106112017CDJXY080010)资助成果
关键词
国际投资争端解决
多元化机制
平行程序
国际投资协定
Sttlement of International Investment Disputes
Diversification Mechanism
Parallel Proceedings
International Investment Treaty
