摘要
本文在一个逻辑自洽的理论框架下同时探讨了国有企业的创新效率和中国本土企业的自主创新困局。通过构建内生技术水平的理论模型,本文发现:对于企业的自主创新活动,信贷所有制歧视和软预算约束不仅具有"挤出效应",还具有"补偿效应"。当企业从事自主创新活动的利润较低时,补偿效应大于挤出效应,国有企业比重的增加将提高总体的自主创新水平;反之,补偿效应小于挤出效应,国有企业比重的增加将降低总体的自主创新水平。因此,国有企业的自主创新活动存在着门槛特征。在此基础上,本文利用1997—2013年的省际面板数据进行了实证检验,结果很好地证实了我们的猜想。最后,本文得出了结论和相应的启示。
This paper builds a theoretical model to investigate both the innovation efficiency of state-owned enterprises（SOE）and the innovation dilemma of local enterprises in China. Our study finds that,the proportion of SOE is positively related to the innovation level of all corporations when the profit of innovation activity is low. On the contrary,while the profit of innovation activity is high,the increase of the proportion of SOE brings the innovation level down. Therefore,the threshold effect exists in SOE’s innovation activity. An empirical analysis by using the provincial data from 1997 to 2013 confirms our theoretical results. Finally,the conclusion and the corresponding revelation are presented.
作者
李勇
Li Yong(School of Economics and Management, Northwest University, Xi＇an 710127, China)
出处
《南开经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第3期100-116,共17页
Nankai Economic Studies
基金
教育部人文社会科学基金青年项目(17YIC790084)
陕西省博士后基金的资助
关键词
国有企业
补偿效应
挤出效应
门槛特征
State-owned Enterprises
Compensation Effect
Crowding-out Effect
Threshold Effects
