摘要
我国上市公司高管"天价薪酬"和"零薪酬"并存的乱象引发了全社会关于"高管薪酬由何决定"的广泛讨论,在这场讨论中,高管的社会资本作为人力资源的重要组成部分却极少被提及。本文从理论上辨析管理层任职网络中蕴含的两类社会资本——信息资本和控制资本。信息资本反映高管对信息资源的获取能力,而控制资本则体现高管对影响力、权力、人情、支持的获取能力。进而选取2003-2015年我国A股上市公司为样本,构建以全体管理层成员为结点的任职网络,运用因子分析得到信息资本和控制资本的动因变量,探究社会资本对高管薪酬的影响。研究发现:(1)高管社会资本的增加正向影响其薪酬水平。(2)高控制资本会降低薪酬业绩敏感性,而高信息资本对薪酬业绩敏感性无显著影响。(3)高控制资本降低了薪酬对非操纵性业绩的敏感性,而高信息资本则降低了薪酬对操纵性业绩的敏感性。本文的研究结论为分辨任职网络中的社会资本及其不同功效提供重要依据,也为高管薪酬的影响因素提供了社会网络层面的经验证据。
The coexistence of ＂astronomical salaries＂ and ＂zero salaries＂ for executives in Chinese listed firms has led to extensive discussions about ＂what determines managerial compensation＂among academics and practitioners,while social capital,as an important component of human resource,has received little attention. We theoretically distinguish two kinds of social capital-information capital and control capital that both generate from managerial employment network. Specifically,information capital reflects the capacity of executives in obtaining information,while control capital represents the capacity of executives in grasping influence,power,favor and support. Based on a sample include 2003-2014 Chinese A-share listed companies,we establish an employment network with the whole managerial members as its vertices and using factor analysis to get proxy variables for social capital. By further exploring how social capital function in managerial compensation,we find that：（ 1） Both kinds of social capital positively affect executive compensation.（ 2） Control capital decreases the performance sensitivity of compensation while information capital does not present such effect.（ 3） Control capital significantly decreases non-discretional sensitivity while information capital significantly decreases discretional sensitivity. The conclusions of our research shed light on distinguishing various social capitals and their roles in employment network as well as providing empirical evidence about factors that affect managerial compensation from the perspective of social network.
作者
张俊瑞
王良辉
汪方军
Zhang Junrui;Wang Lianghui;Wang Fangjun(School of Management, Xi＇ an Jiaotong University, Xi＇ an 710049)
出处
《管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第6期136-148,共13页
Management Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71472148)
全国会计名家工程项目(MOF[2015]14)
关键词
社会网络
社会资本
高管薪酬
信息优势
管理层权力
social network
social capital
compensation
information advantage
managerial power
