摘要
新一轮深化电力体制改革下,发电侧电力市场将逐步全面放开,现行电力调度模式已无法适应计划体制到市场体制的过渡。经济新常态下行政导向的去产能政策虽暂时减缓了新建节奏,但对退出落后产能效果甚微。本文以广东电力市场为对象,对新老机组的新进入成本(CONE)和单位容量净收益进行分析,发现早期投产的低效机组实际CONE显著低于新投产的高效机组,但低效老机组的单位容量净收益高于高效新机组,故出现了落后煤电产能不愿退出市场的"激励扭曲";另一方面,尽管已产能过剩,现行体制依然在激励新的投资进入。经济调度模拟下发现普遍产能过剩下调峰机组在尖峰时段的"稀缺收益"因过剩而被压低导致全部煤电机组收益受损。研究表明,重塑发电企业短期运行与长期投资决策的经济框架是供给侧改革政策真正落到实处的关键,既要通过市场信号来保障电力系统的经济运行,又要通过必要的监管机制来保障电力供应的长期充裕度。
Under the new round of deepening reform of the power system, the generation-side of power market will gradually be liberalized fully, and the traditional power dispatch model has been unable to adapt to the transition from the planned system to the market system. Although the administratively oriented capacity-reduction policy has temporarily slowed down the pace of new construction under the new normal economic, it has limited effect on the withdrawal of backward production capacity. With Guangdong power market as the research objective this paper analyzes the cost of new entry（CONE） and net revenue per unit capacity of the new and old units. It finds that the real CONE of inefficient units which put into production in early time is significantly lower than that of the new units with high-efficiency. Meanwhile, the net revenue per unit capacity of the inefficient old units is higher than efficient new units have led to the ＂incentive distortion＂, that the backward coal-fired power generation capacity is unwilling to withdraw from the market. Meanwhile, even with overcapacity, new investment is economically incentivized under existing regime. Under the market economic dispatch simulation, the ＂scarce return＂ of the peaking unit at the peak period has been depressed because the excess of production capacity, which will lead to a loss of all coal-fired power generation units. Research shows that reshaping the economic framework of short-term operation and long-term investment decisions of power generation companies is the key to implement supply-side reform. It is necessary to ensure the economic operation of the power system through market signals, and to ensure the long-term availability of electricity supply through the necessary supervision mechanisms.
出处
《中国能源》
2018年第5期5-9,共5页
Energy of China
基金
国家社科基金重大项目"清洁能源价格竞争力及财税价格政策研究"(编号:15ZDB165)
关键词
新进入成本
单位容量净收益
供给侧结构性改革
Cost of New Entry
Net Revenue per Unit Capacity
Supply-side Structural Reform
