摘要
文章以2010-2016年上市公司为研究对象,以"八项规定"的实施为契机,研究廉政建设的信号传递作用、政治背景与在职消费关系。研究表明,国有企业高管政治背景级别越高,在职消费也越高;"八项规定"惩戒信息公告对在职消费产生了抑制作用,这种作用与信息公告涉及的所在区域处理干部数量关系明显。对于政治背景越高的国有企业高管来说,"八项规定"惩戒信息公告对其在职消费约束作用越大。进一步研究表明,"八项规定"惩戒信息公告在不同年份以及对不同市场化程度地区企业产生不同影响。这种政治关系与在职消费之间的关系在非国有企业中并不明显。
This paper takes listed companies as the research object,between 2010—2016 years,and takes the implementation of the Eight Rules as a focus for studying the relationship among the construction of a clean government,political background and perquisite consumption. This paper shows that,in state-owned enterprises the higher the level of the political background,the degree of excessive consumption is higher; the announcement of Eight Rules’ discipline has effect on perquisite consumption. This effect is closely related to the number of cadres involved in the announcement. For the state-owned enterprises with higher political background,the effect of Eight Rules discipline on its perquisite consumption is greater. Further research shows that the Eight Rules discipline has different effects in different years and enterprises with different degrees of marketization. This relationship between the political background and perquisite consumption is not clear in non-state-owned enterprises.
作者
王明虎
荣益辰
WANG Ming-hu;RONG Yi-chen(School of Business,Anhui University of Technology,Ma’anshan 243002 , Chin)
出处
《商业经济与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第5期87-97,共11页
Journal of Business Economics
关键词
在职消费
八项规定
信号作用
政治背景
perquisite consumption
Eight Rules
signalization
political background
