摘要
现有全球经济治理体系中的美国霸权是否必然会衰退?美国可能会做出哪些策略选择?中国等新兴大国又该如何认知与应对?回答上述问题的现有研究成果侧重于描述性的定性分析和经验性的对策研究,这导致在分析霸权与全球经济治理的本质联系和影响机理、理解治理目标与大国的策略选择上的解释力和逻辑性不足。作者基于霸权收益与公共品供给均存在预算软约束等现实,通过建立和运用博弈论模型深入探讨了霸权与全球经济治理之间的内在关系、影响机制与应对之道。研究证实:第一,霸权国相对实力越强大,越能以更低的成本获得霸权收益,实现国家利益的最大化。第二,霸权国相对实力越强,越倾向于不断索取剩余效用,不劳而获的偏好越强烈。第三,霸权国必将陷入公共品供给困境,效用衰减和霸权衰退难以避免,霸权国只有与其他大国合作提供公共品才能维护全球经济治理体系的稳定。作者建立了从公共品的供需角度分析霸权与全球经济治理之间互动机制与内在约束的理论分析框架,为解释美国的霸权政策选择和提出中国的策略应对提供了新的研究视野和分析工具,并给出了相应的博弈策略与政策建议。
Is it an inevitable trend for the U.S. hegemony to plunge into recession in the existing global economic governance system? What strategic options may the United States make for this purpose? What's the rational cognitive and strategic response for China and other emerging powers? Existing research that addresses these issues focuses on descriptive qualitative analysis and empirical countermeasure research that lead to the insufficiency of explaining the essential linkages between hegemony and global eco-nomic governance,impact mechanisms,governance objectives and the strategic choices of major powers. This article, based on the major factual characteristics of hedging benefits and soft goods constraint in public goods supply,attempts to explore the essential relationship between hegemony and global economic governance and the mechanism and solution by establishing and applying game theory model. The research confirms that firstly,the stronger the relative power of the hegemonic power is,the more it can obtain the hegemony benefits at a lower cost so as to maximize its own national interests. Secondly,the stronger the relative power of the hegemony power,the more it tends to continuously obtain the residual utility. Thirdly, the existence of hegemony can effectively maintain the stability of the existing global economic governance system.Fourthly,the hegemonic power is destined to plunge into the dilemma of supply of public goods. The decay of its effectiveness and the decline of hegemony are the inevitable results. Only when the hegemon power cooperates with major powers to provide public goods can it effectively maintain the stability of the global economic governance system. The article establishes a theoretical analysis framework for analyzing the operating mechanism and the inherent restraint of hegemony and global economic governance from the perspective of public goods supply and provides a new research perspective and analytical tools for explaining the choice of hegemony between the United States and Chi
出处
《世界经济与政治》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第5期131-148,共18页
World Economics and Politics
基金
本文系国家社科基金重大项目(项目编号：15ZDA018)、国家社科基金一般项目(项目编号：14BGJ047)的阶段性成果.
关键词
全球经济治理
霸权收益
公共品供给
预算软约束
博弈模型
global economic governance
hegemony income
public goods supply
budget soft constraint
game model
