摘要
由于监管缺失、信用风险管理缺位,导致网络借贷市场的违约事件持续出现,损害网络借贷市场的参与者利益。本文构建了一个包括网络借贷平台、金融监管机构和投资者的网络借贷市场参与主体的三方行为策略演化博弈模型,从演化博弈的角度分析了网络借贷平台、金融监管机构和投资者的策略选择对网络借贷市场运行的影响,并以拍拍贷平台为案例进行数值模拟分析。研究结果表明：不同初始值的三方博弈结果存在显著差异,网络借贷市场参与主体行为策略的演化博弈不具有稳定中心点、且不存在稳定的均衡点。另外,当金融监管机构采取＂严格监管＂措施时,惩罚值越高,网络借贷平台越倾向于选择＂自律＂的行为策略,随着投资者投资额度的增加,网络借贷平台选择＂自律＂行为策略的概率逐渐降低。最后,提出规范网络借贷市场参与者行为和风险控制的对策建议。
The default events often occur on online lending market which damages the interests of participants due to lack of supervision and credit risk management.In this paper,a trilateral evolutionary game model which includes online lending platform,financial regulators and investors on online lending market is constructed.From the evolutionary game perspective,How the strategies of online lending platform,financial regulators and investors influence the operation of online lending market is addressed,and PaipPaiDai platform is taken as a case for numerical simulation analysis.The findings show that the difference of the results of trilateral game is significant with different initial values.The evolutionary game of participants＇ strategy does not have stable center point and stable equilibrium point on online lending market.In addition,online lending platform tends to take self-discipline strategy when financial regulators take strict supervision measures.Online lending platform tends to select self-discipline strategy gradually with the investment amounts increase.Finally,the countermeasures and suggestions are put forward to regulate the participants＇ behavior and risk control on online lending market.
作者
刘伟
夏立秋
LIU Wei;XIA Li-qiu(School of Management Science ＆Engineering, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian 116025, China)
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2018年第5期169-177,共9页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
教育部人文社科基金项目(17YJA630059)
辽宁省教育厅科学研究项目(LN2016YB006)
东北财经大学校级科研项目(DUFE2017Y04)
关键词
网络借贷市场
互联网金融
演化博弈
三方博弈
online lending market
internet finance
evolutionary game
trilateral game
