摘要
董事责任险是企业治理领域的热点问题。基于2006-2015年我国沪深上市公司数据,实证检验董事责任险对企业创新的影响及其治理职能发挥路径。研究发现,董事责任险作为独立治理机制,对企业创新不具有显著影响;董事责任险治理职能被董事会特征激活,即二者间存在显著交互影响关系,说明董事责任险通过董事会特征等治理机制对企业创新产生影响;董事责任险的引入助长了企业机会主义行为,从而抑制了企业创新。
Directors＇ liability insurance （D1） was a hot issue of corporate governance. Based on the Chinese listed companies from 2006 to 2015, the relationships between DI and the corporate innovation and the path of DI to play its function were tested. The results showed there wasn＇t significant effect on innovation when DI worked as an independent mechanism; But the governance function of DI was activated by the characteristics of the board; The results showed that DI couldn＇t promote the companies＇ innovation, and the results supported the opportunism hypothesis.
作者
凌士显
白锐锋
Ling Shixian;Bai Ruifeng(Business School of Shanclong University, Weihai 264209 ,Chin)
出处
《科技进步与对策》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第10期100-106,共7页
Science & Technology Progress and Policy
基金
山东省社会科学基金项目(15CJJJ16)
关键词
董事责任险
董事会治理
企业创新
企业治理
Directors＇ Liability Insurance
Board Governance
Corporate Innovation
Corporate Governance
