摘要
参与主体利益缺乏保障是当前农村土地经营权抵押融资业务发展不充分、效果不明显的症结所在。乡村振兴战略下,"政府—农业经营者—银行"构成农村土地经营权抵押融资业务"利益博弈三角"。通过建立以政府为间接调控者、农业经营主体和银行为直接利益主体的动态博弈模型,获得参与者利益最大化的纳什均衡解,发现风险补偿基金的补偿比例、抵押贷款利率、土地评估价值、土地价格波动率等是影响利益相关者博弈动力的重要因素。因此,为进一步平衡利益、增强参与积极性,政府应适度监管、防范风险,促进利益共享;平衡资金供给、防范信贷风险是银行的客观选择;强化诚信意识、提升经营能力应成为农业"合意"经营主体的必备素养。
The interest imbalance of the participants in mortgage financing of rural land management right is the crux of insufficient development and obscure effect of the business. In the new era,especially under the rural-revitalization strategy,the participants in the mortgage financing have produced fresh interest appeals. By establishing a dynamic game model the government acts as indirect regulator,the agricultural management entities as well as the banks act as the main participants,we found the Nash equilibrium solution to maximize the interest of the participants. In addition,the compensation proportion of the risk compensation funds,mortgage interest rate,land evaluation value and the fluctuation rate of land price are important factors that affect the interest game between the participants. In order to balance the interests of participants,balancing loan fund supply and preventing loan risk are objective choices of the banks,strengthening the sense of sincerity and enhancing the management ability are essential accomplishments of agricultural agreeable management subjects,moderate supervision,risk prevention and promotion of benefit sharing are the government＇s missions.
作者
杨林
王璐
Yang Lin;Wang Lu(Business School,Shandong University,Weihai Shandong 26420)
出处
《宁夏社会科学》
CSSCI
2018年第3期77-85,共9页
NingXia Social Sciences
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目"城乡公共服务资源均衡配置的财政实现机制研究"(项目编号:14AGL022)的阶段性成果
关键词
农村土地经营权抵押融资
利益相关者
博弈
乡村振兴战略
mortgage financing of rural land management right
stakeholders
game
rural-revitalization strategy
