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股权众筹参与主体利益均衡博弈分析 被引量:1

Analysis of Equity Balanced Participants' Benefit Balanced Game
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摘要 2017年李克强总理在政府工作报告中再次强调互联网金融对于打破传统金融业垄断地位的重要作用,在政府政策导向和创业热潮的推动下,股权众筹迅速崛起,引起金融界的广泛关注。回顾股权众筹建立到运行两大关键环节,既可以使我们了解股权众筹发展的影响因素,也可以挖掘中国股权众筹市场巨大的发展潜力。本文以博弈论为主要理论基础,从股权众筹发展的两个关键环节出发,对股权众筹参与核心主体进行博弈分析。在建立环节,围绕政府与众筹平台之间博弈展开论述,重点通过建立股权众筹平台与政府部门的博弈模型,求解纳什均衡解,对政府部门、众筹平台提出改进措施与建议,实现各个参与主体的利益均衡;在股权众筹运行环节,我们研究分析了当前"领投+跟投"模式,建立不同的利益参与主体多方博弈模型,通过分析参与主体之间的利益分配关系,揭示不同参与主体运行过程中的决策行为,随后结合模型分析结果,提出实现均衡的措施与建议。 In 2017, Premier Li Keqiang again stressed in the government work report that Internet finance plays an important role in breaking the monopoly position of traditional financial industries. With the promotion of government policies and entrepreneurial craze, the rapid rise of equity crowdfunding has aroused widespread concern in the financial community. Reviewing the two key aspects of the establishment of public-equity-fund-raising by public ownership can not only enable us to understand the factors that affect the development of equity crowdfunding, but also tap the huge potential for development in China's equity crowdfunding market.This article takes game theory as the main theoretical basis, starting from two key aspects of the development of equity crowdfunding and conducts a game analysis on the core subject of equity crowdfunding participation. In the process of establishment, the paper discusses the game between the government and crowdfunding platform, and focuses on building a game model of the equity crowdfunding platform and government departments to solve the Nash equilibrium problem and put forward improvement measures and suggestions to the government departments and the crowdfunding platform, In the process of equity crowdfunding operation, we study and analyze the current "lead + follow-up" model and establish different multi-player game models of stakeholder participation. By analyzing the distribution of interests among participating parties, Participate in the decision-making behavior of the main running process, and then combine the model analysis results, put forward measures and suggestions to achieve balance.
作者 左丹 Zuo Dan(Nanjing University of Finance and Economics,Nanjing 210046,China)
机构地区 南京财经大学
出处 《江苏商论》 2018年第5期86-89,共4页 Jiangsu Commercial Forum
关键词 股权众筹 领投人 跟投人 利益均衡 博弈 equity crowdfunding lead investor follower interest balance game
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