摘要
资金短缺是阻碍农业技术创新的主要原因,稳健有效的金融体系,不仅能够合理调动金融资源,实现农业技术这个农业"第一生产力"与资本这一经济发展的"第一推动力"的有效结合,还能提升我国农业技术含量,实现农业经济可持续发展。构建金融机构"银行"与农业技术创新企业之间的博弈模型,探究影响银行和农业技术创新企业融资策略主要因素和行动结果。研究发现:信贷寻租行为对解决信息不对称的结果不是一成不变的,而是随着银行的信用风险防范和农业技术创新企业的回报付出扭曲度变化;只有实现农业技术创新企业的回报付出不严重扭曲,才能保证有效的分离均衡出现,才能有效避免信贷寻租出现,银行才能避免出现大量的贷款损失,应尽最大努力制止利用信贷寻租实现的农业技术创新金融支持行为发生。
The shortage of funds is the main obstruction of agricultural technological innovation.A stable and effective financial system can not only reasonably mobilize financial resources,but also realize the effective coordination of agricultural technology,the"first productivity"of agriculture and capital,the"first driving force"for economic development.It can also foster China’s agricultural technology and contribute to sustainable economic development of agriculture.This paper builds a game model between banks of financial institutions and agricultural technology innovation companies and explores the main factors and actions that affect the financing strategies of them.The study reveals that the results of credit corruption on solving information asymmetry are flexible,changing with the bank’s credit risk prevention and the return of agricultural technology innovation companies,and that strict control or even eliminating credit corruption is not conducive to the financing of agricultural technology innovation.The impact is enormous and only if the returns of agricultural technology innovation enterprises are not seriously distorted can they ensure an effective separation and balance while banks can avoid many loan losses.
出处
《苏州大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第3期103-110,共8页
Journal of Soochow University(Philosophy & Social Science Edition)
基金
国家社会科学基金项目"供给侧结构性改革背景下的农村金融服务创新和风险控制研究"(项目编号:17BJY119)的阶段性成果
关键词
农业技术创新
金融支持
博弈分析
agricultural technology innovation
financial support
game analysis
