摘要
运用委托代理理论分析"防范征地冲突外包制"中存在的委托代理关系,提出相应的激励措施。地方政府与村委会为获取"帕累托改进"而缔结防范契约,但由于存在隐性契约和非对称信息的缺陷,后者易发生逆向选择和道德风险导致委托代理关系破裂。通过构建理论模型探讨地方政府有效激励村委会防范征地冲突的改进措施,提出:考虑把村民、开发商等纳入契约框架,接受社会监督,增强契约的约束力;从信号传递及信号甄别的角度,派驻征收项目顾问,建立绩效评价机制,有利于防范风险,维持委托代理关系的稳定和高效运行;对于政治偏好型村委会,可通过设计预期政治晋升和嘉奖来降低逆向选择风险;对于经济偏好型村委会可适当提高收益分配比例,加大违法成本以防范道德风险。
This paper uses principal agent theory to analyze the principal-agent relationship in the prevention of land expropriation conflicts and puts forward the corresponding incentive measures.In order to obtain the"Pareto improvement",local governments and village committees concluded prevention contract,but due to the defects of implicit contract and asymmetric information,the latter is prone to adverse selection and moral hazard caused by principal-agent relationship rupture.Based on the theoretical model,this paper discusses the improvement measures of local government to effectively encourage the village committee to prevent land expropriation conflicts and proposes some countermeasures and suggestions.Firstly,the villagers and developers are considered to be fitted into the framework of contract and supervised by the society so as to strengthen the restraint power of implicit contract.Secondly,from the point of signal transmission and signal screening,it is required to levy project consultant,establish performance evaluation mechanism,which is conducive to risk prevention,maintaining the stable and efficient operation of principal-agent relationship.Thirdly,as for political preference type village committees,political promotion and reward can be anticipated to reduce the risk of adverse selection.Finally,as for the economic preference village committees,it may be appropriate to increase the proportion of income distribution and increase the cost of violation of law so as to prevent moral hazard.
出处
《华中农业大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第3期130-136,共7页
Journal of Huazhong Agricultural University(Social Sciences Edition)
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究项目"地方政府防范群体性征地冲突事件的能力表征
建设成效与提升策略研究"(13YJA790101)
关键词
征地冲突
地方政府
委托代理
非对称信息
隐性契约
land expropriation conflicts
local government
principal-agent
asymmetric information
implicit contract
