摘要
本文以2007~2013年沪深两市A股公用事业类上市公司为样本,从盈余管理动机切入研究高管的盈余操纵行为对政府补助的影响。研究发现,公司存在利用负向盈余管理提高政府补助的行为,具体体现为政策性和偶发性补助的增加。高管业绩薪酬敏感度增加了负向盈余管理的成本,因此业绩薪酬越敏感的公司,其利用负向盈余管理提高政府补助的行为越少发生;政治关联可以替代负向盈余管理,因此只有不存在政治关联的公司才会利用负向盈余管理获得补助。负向盈余管理的作用具有持续性,当期盈余管理会增加未来第2期至第4期的政府补助。审计质量可以抑制负向盈余管理对政府补助的影响,而机构投资者未能发挥治理作用。
Using a large sample of China＇s utility industry firm from 2007 and 2013, this paper studies the impact of executives＇ earning management on government subsidies. We find that negative earnings management is associated with more government subsidies, especially for policy-related and occasional subsidies. There are several elements playing moderate effect in the relationship between negative earnings management and government subsidies. First, executives＇ performance-sensitive compensation increases the cost of negative earnings management, therefore the higher performance sensitivity of executive pay, the less significant of government subsidies to negative earnings management. Second, there is a substitute relationship between political connections and negative earnings management. The positive relationship between subsidies and negative earnings management is significant only when the focal firm has no political connections. Third, audit quality can reduce the influence of negative earnings management on government subsidies, while institutional investors do not play such a governance role. Moreover, the impact of negative earnings management on government subsidies is persistent, earnings management in current year will increase the future government subsidies in the next 2 to 4 year.
出处
《证券市场导报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第4期42-51,共10页
Securities Market Herald
基金
国家自然科学基金"媒体地域属性
媒体报道倾向与上市公司投融资行为"(批准号:71462011)
江西省高校人文社会科学研究"巨额公关寻租
媒体异化与市场认知偏差研究"(批准号:GL162040)
关键词
政府补助
负向盈余管理
业绩薪酬
政治关联
government subsidies, negative earnings management, performance-sensitive compensation, political connections
