摘要
文章利用领导干部自然资源资产离任审计试点这一事件,研究了试点对重污染、资源型企业权益资本成本的影响,在此基础上考察了政治关联的增量效应。研究发现,试点对重污染、资源型企业权益资本成本整体上没有显著影响,但提高了试点地区没有政治关联企业的权益资本成本。还发现试点后没有政治关联的重污染、资源型企业业绩下降,而有政治关联的企业业绩无显著变化,这进一步支持了文章的结论。文章研究结果表明,领导干部自然资源资产离任审计实施会导致重污染、资源型企业面临更高的权益资本成本,但政治关联可以弱化这种影响。文章初步检验了领导干部自然资源资产离任审计制度的经济后果,也丰富了权益资本成本领域的研究。
Based on the pilot projects of leading officials＇ accountability audit of natural resources, this paper studies on the influences of the audits on the cost of equity capital of heavily polluting and resource-based companies, and explores the incremental effect on political connection. We find that the pilot projects overall have no influence on the cost of equity capital for those firms, however, the cost of equity capital for the firms without political connection increases. Further analysis shows that the performance of these enterprises without political connection in pilot area significantly decreases, and that of the firms with political connection does not change. This evidence further supports the above conclusions. The cost of equity capital of heavily polluting and resource- based companies will increase after the system is executed, but political connection will soften this impact. The research preliminarily examines the economic consequences of leading officials＇ accountability audit of natural resources, and contributes to the research on the cost of equity capital.
作者
全进
刘文军
谢帮生
Quan Jin ,Liu Wenjun ,Xie Bangsheng
出处
《审计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第2期46-54,共9页
Auditing Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(项目批准号:71702032)
福建省社会科学研究基地重大项目(项目批准号:2016JDZ040)
福建省高校杰出青年科研人才培育计划项目(2017)
福建农林大学科技创新专项基金项目(项目批准号:CXZX2016224)的阶段性成果
关键词
领导干部自然资源资产离任审计
权益资本成本
政治关联
leading officials＇ accountability audit of natural resources, cost of equity capital, political connection
