摘要
中央政府针对房地产市场的宏观调控政策的有效性与地方政府举债行为密切相关。本文从地方债务这一视角出发,从理论和实证两方面论证了地方债务、土地市场与房价波动之间的相互影响机制,并进一步验证这种影响是否存在显著的区域性差异。地方债务通过引资竞争和土地财政两条渠道影响房价。一是通过土地和基建引资推动经济增长,提高居民收入水平,从需求层面拉动房价上涨;二是通过土地财政,引起地价上涨,从成本层面推动房价上涨。而房价上涨会继续推动地价上涨,土地升值降低了地方债务风险,同时也使地方政府能够获取更多的债务融资。这种作用机制存在明显的区域性差异：以地方债务引资推动经济增长的效果不同,地方政府依靠发债引资来拉动经济增长的模式不论是在东部地区还是在中西部地区都难以持久。
The effectiveness of the central government＇ s macro-control policy on the real estate market is closely related to the local government debt. In the view of the local government debt,this paper demonstrated the interaction mechanism of local government debt,land market and housing prices fluctuation from the theoretical and empirical aspects,and further testwhether there are significant regional differences. Local government debt affects housing prices by two channels, that is by competition for investment-attracting and by land finance. One channel is pushing housing price up from demand-driven by lowering industrial land price and increasing infrastructure investment to promote economic growth and residents income; the other channel is promoting housing price from cost-driven through land finance, which causes land price rising. The rising of housing prices continues to drive up land price,which reduces the risk of local government debt,while allowing local government to obtain more bank loans for more debt financing. There are obvious regional differences in this interaction mechanism：the effects of investment attracting by raising debt are different.
作者
田新民
武晓婷
Tian Xinmin Wu Xiaoting
出处
《数量经济研究》
CSSCI
2017年第2期49-65,共17页
The Journal of Quantitative Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“债务的可持续度量指标及其促进经济增长内生机制的分析与比较研究”(14BJL030)的资助
关键词
地方债务
引资竞争
土地财政
房价
Local Government Debt Competition for Investment Land Finance HousingPrice
