摘要
由公寓和其他小户型单位引起的财政负外部性通常被作为例证，用来说明对地方土地使用限制的理由，例如最低地产要求和对多家庭开发的限制。因为这些法规有效限制了本可以在社区内建造的小住宅的数量，所以，支持者主张，这种类型的限制有助于确保新住宅将“为自己支付”，依据是在房产税资助的地方政府体系的范围内限制搭便车的行为。然而，反对者一再坚持，这类政策掩盖了限制低收入家庭进入郊区的企图针对位于多户住宅（即公寓）和单户住宅的明确区分。文章发现了强有力的证据，即以人均价值和每个儿童的价值来衡量的住宅人均价值，实际上公寓较高，而非独居家庭住宅。因此，在其他条件保持不变的情况下，社区的有效房产税税率随公寓占住宅存量的份额的提高而下降。这些研究成果与一些假定相反，这些假定常被用来证实许多现今的土地使用限制，并提出有关现代财政分区效果作为一种工具促进财政联邦主义的建立。
Negative fiscal externalities produced by apartments and other small housing units are commonly cited as the justifica- tion for many local land - use restrictions, such as minimum lot requirements and limits on muhifamily developments. Because these laws effectively limit the number of small dwellings that can be built within a community, proponents argue that restrictions of this type help to guarantee that new homes will ＂pay for themselves＂ by discouraging free - riding behavior within a system of property tax funded local governments. Critics, however, have maintained that such policies constitute a veiled attempt by subur- ban communities at restricting entry for low - income families. Focusing on the clear distinction between housing units located in muhifamily structures （ i. e. , apartments） and single - family homes, this paper finds strong evidence that residential per capita values, measured as value per person and value per child, are actually higher for apartments, not single family residences. Consequently, communities＇ effective property tax rates decline as apartments＇ share of the housing stock rises, holding all else equal. These findings are contrary to the set of assumptions that are often used to justify many of today＇s land - use restrictions and raise serious questions regarding the efficacy of modem fiscal zoning as a tool for promoting efficient fiscal federalism.
出处
《经济社会体制比较》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第2期55-68,共14页
Comparative Economic & Social Systems
关键词
公寓
小房子
财政外部性
房产税
财政分区
Muhifamily Housing
Small Homes
Fiscal Externalities
Property Tax
Fiscal Zoning
