摘要
布兰顿的推理主义主张概念内容的理解和说明应该根据其推理的联系,拒斥传统表征语义理论的从下而上的语义说明,由此导致一棘手问题,即如何根据概念之间的推理联系说明概念的表征维度?借助替换这种语义推理方法和命题态度的从言和从物之区分,布兰顿对此作出了回答。其回答一方面使得因语言转向而被放逐的"世界"重新召回了哲学家的视野,另一方面又招致了他人丧失"世界"的批评;而从推理主义的理论基底和逻辑行动主义方法论这一新型方法论视角,则可以清晰概念表征维度推理主义说明路径的更多合理性。
Brandom's Inferentialism claims that the conceptual content should be understood in terms of their inferential articulation. Hence it rejects bottom-up semantic explanation of the traditional representational semantic theory. It induces a thorny problem which how to explain the representational dimension of concepts according to inferential articulation among concepts. Brandom gives an answer to the problem by means of the semantic inferential method of substitution and the distinction between de dicto and de re ascription of propositional attitudes. On one hand, his reply makes "the world" that had been banished because of the Linguistic Turn recall the philosopher's view, and on the other hand, inevitably leads to the criticism that "the world" is lost.However, we make rationality of inferentialism interpretation of the representational dimension of concepts explicit from the theoretical base of inferentialism and the perspective of the Methodology of Logical Actionism.
出处
《淮阴师范学院学报（哲学社会科学版）》
2018年第2期151-155,共5页
Journal of Huaiyin Teachers College(Social Sciences Edition)
基金
江苏省哲学社会科学基金后期资助项目(17HQ006)
江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金项目(2015SJB676)
关键词
布兰顿
推理主义
概念
表征维度
Brandom
Inferentialism
Concept
Representational Dimension
